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A WORLD WITHOUT DEBT
BARRY E. ADLER7
"That we might live in a world without bankruptcy law or any similar
collective procedure is not as far-fetched or as ridiculous as it might seem
at first glance to those of us who are immersed in its intricacies every
day."' This is the conclusion of Douglas Baird in an article titled A World
Without Bankruptcy. In that article, Baird imagines what the world would
be like if there were no bankruptcy law. He hastens to add, however, that
"[t]he reason for engaging in this thought experiment is not that it is either
wise or at all likely that we abandon bankruptcy law. I think neither is the
case. Rather the point of the exercise is to isolate bankruptcy issues from
other issues."2
In this paper I borrow not only the structure of Baird's title, but the
structure of his argument as well. I imagine not only a world without
bankruptcy, but a world without debt. In my thought experiment, a world
without either is efficient. I do not believe such a world is as far-fetched
as it may at first glance seem to those of us immersed in the intricacies of
bankruptcy. I do think it is wise, in principle, to do away with bankruptcy
law. I believe firms might, in response, do away with debt. I agree with
Baird that the abolition of bankruptcy is unlikely. But my guess is that this
is unfortunate, because when I attempt to "isolate bankruptcy issues from
other issues," I find no bankruptcy issues.
In Part I of this essay, I give a brief description of the collective action
problem that Baird identifies as the bankruptcy issue for corporate
debtors.' I do so not because I believe the reader needs the refresher.
Rather, I do so because a statement of the standard version collective action
problem is a necessary preface to my explanation of why I think there is
no such problem and, consequently, why I think there is in principle no
need for corporate bankruptcy.
In Part II, I explain why I believe there is no collective action problem
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. I thank Bob Rasmussen and George Triantis for
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at
173, 174.
2. Id.
3. As will become clear, my arguments apply only to corporate debtors.
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and give what I believe is an essentially simple explanation of a world
without debt. In such a world, I envision "Chameleon Equity" firms,
which necessarily differ from traditional firms only in their substitution of
preferred equity for debt, but may also differ in their ability to use many
tranches of claims in a hierarchical capital structure. This is a brief reprise
of arguments I have made elsewhere. Given recent criticisms-which, as
I explain in Part III, I believe are largely misunderstandings-of my earlier
work, I hope to take this opportunity to clarify my ideas.
In Part III, I respond directly to the criticisms of a world without debt.
These criticisms suppose that firms with traditional debt and, therefore,
subject to bankruptcy provide their investors with certain benefits that a
firm in a world without debt could not provide. I explain that a firm
without debt might differ from a traditional firm only in the investors'
inability to collect individually. Therefore, inasmuch as the sole proper
role of bankruptcy reorganization of a firm with debt is to solve the
collective action problem, a firm without debt could well forgo costly
bankruptcy.
Finally, in Part IV, I admit the limits inherent in my view of appropriate
bankruptcy policy. Wholly apart from the character of initial investor
contracts, bankruptcy is conceivably valuable because it serves society's
distributional objectives or because it allows a judge to make decisions for
a firm ex post using information that no one has ex ante. If there is great
value, apart from collective action, to a bankruptcy reorganization
proceeding, the elimination of debt that I propose might be counterproduc-
tive, given that the principal advantage of a debtless world would be the
avoidance of a bankruptcy reorganization. However, if bankruptcy offers
benefits other than collective action, it is not clear to me why government
does not provide these benefits outside the bankruptcy setting.
Part V concludes that a world without debt would, in principle, be a
world without the need for bankruptcy. Little would be lost. Although I
confess that I may have gone too far in my zeal for a simple story, no
argument I have seen convinces me that I have.
I. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
At its core, bankruptcy supplants individual creditor debt collection
remedies with a "collectivized debt collection device."'  In theory,
bankruptcy's collectivized proceeding is superior to individual creditor
4. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7 (1986).
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actions because individual creditors have perverse incentives to act in their
own interests, even if those interests disserve the creditors' collective
interest. Thus, bankruptcy is beneficial to the extent it protects creditors
from their own worst instincts.5
To illustrate, assume a debtor firm operates a business worth more as a
going concern than if its assets were sold piecemeal. That is, the assets are
worth more as parts of the debtor's business than they are distributed
separately to become parts of other businesses. Assume further that the
debtor is subject to obligations even greater than the value of the firm as
a going concern and that the debtor is in default on those obligations. The
debtor has insufficient assets to pay all creditors in full, so each creditor
has an incentive to collect on its debt before the debtor's assets are depleted
by other creditors' collections. In the absence of bankruptcy law, this
creditors' race to the assets likely would divide those assets piecemeal, with
each race winner taking a piece of the debtor large enough to satisfy its
own claim. As a result, the creditors would take from the debtor assets
worth in the aggregate only the piecemeal liquidation value. At the time
of such a race, the creditors would prefer to keep the debtor's assets intact
to preserve the higher going-concern value. But, without bankruptcy law,
each creditor would know that it could be left without recourse to any
assets if it delayed its own action on the mere hope that the creditors would
both find one another and agree to act collectively. This dilemma of
coordination is the collective action problem.
Bankruptcy solves the collective action problem by disallowing
individual creditor action.7 A bankruptcy court supervises the use and
disposition of the debtor's assets and can hold the assets together to
maximize their value.' The court then divides the value of the assets
among creditors in an orderly fashion, either through the sale of the assets
to a third party and the distribution of sale proceeds,9 or through the
5. See generally id. at 1-19.
6. Id.
7. A bankruptcy petition automatically stays any individual creditor action against a debtor. 11
US.C. § 362 (1988).
8. The Bankruptcy Code contains a number of provisions designed to maximize the value of the
debtor as a going concern. See, e g., II U.S.C. § 721 (1988) (allowing the court to authorize the
bankruptcy trustee to operate the business of the debtor if such operation is in the best interest of the
estate); 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1988) (providing that in the case of a reorganization proceeding, the trustee
or the debtor may operate the business of the debtor unless the court orders otherwise); 11 U.S.C. § 363
(1988) (providing the court with the power to supervise transactions outside the ordinary course of
business).
9. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 725-726 (1988).
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distribution of interests in a debtor freed from prebankruptcy obligations.'"
In no instance does an individual creditor have an opportunity unilaterally
to withdraw vital assets.
In the illustration above, for example, the bankruptcy court would
prohibit individual creditor action, and could sell the debtor's business as
a going concern or distribute securities in the firm with an aggregate worth
equal to the value of the firm as a going concern. This sale or distribution
would thus preserve the debtor's going-concern surplus. Such bankruptcy
intervention is thought to reflect the "hypothetical creditors' bargain," or
the solution the creditors would reach could they solve their coordination
problems." Accordingly, bankruptcy's solution to the collective action
problem is the chief justification for its elimination of individual creditor
remedies.
Dean Baird summarizes this analysis as follows: "We may not desire a
world without bankruptcy because the self-interest of creditors leads to a
collective action problem, and a legal mechanism is needed to ensure that
the self-interest of individuals does not run counter to the interests of the
group."12 Baird laments the attempt by some to view bankruptcy as doing
more:
One of the most troublesome aspects of most modem discussion of
bankruptcy law, both academic and judicial, is the reliance upon unarticulated
notions of 'bankruptcy policy.' . . . [M]uch of what is usually thought of as
'bankruptcy policy' is not bankruptcy policy at all, but rather an issue of
general concem that must first be grappled with before the special problems
that arise by virtue of a bankruptcy proceeding are confronted.'
3
II. A WORLD WITHOUT DEBT
It is useful to distinguish bankruptcy policy, i.e., collective action policy,
from issues of general concern. Legal provisions directed to the latter need
not be part of an insolvency regime. Moreover, if, despite Baird's specula-
10. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
11. The illustration is simplistic. In an actual example, there may be subsidiary benefits that
derive from bankruptcy's solution to the collective action problem. These include the elimination of
direct costs from the avoided race to the debtor's assets and the provision of a presumably efficient
common forum for disputes over those assets. All these savings, of going-concern surplus and
collection costs, must be compared to the costs of bankruptcy, some of which are briefly described
below. For a comprehensive description of the basic hypothetical bargain model, see JACKSON, supra
note 4, at 1-19.
12. Baird, supra note I, at 184.
13. Id. at 174.
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tion, there is no need for a legal mechanism to ensure that the self-interest
of individuals does not run counter to the interests of the group, there is no
need for any sort of special insolvency regime. My argument here, born
of a thought experiment about a world without debt, is that there is no need
for any legal mechanism to ensure collective action, and thus, no need for
corporate bankruptcy law or any special insolvency regime.
Before beginning this argument, I want to address the possibility that
neither the risk of insolvency from debt nor bankruptcy law matter much.
The classic story of the collective action problem, and bankruptcy law as
its solution, labors under the assumption that firms have debt held by a
great number of dispersed creditors. In a paper presented at this confer-
ence, Baird questions whether this situation describes the typical firm. 4
Many firms, he observes, operate without significant debt in their capital
structure or with a single dominant creditor."5 Such firms either do not
become insolvent or do not face a collective action problem in the event of
insolvency. I do not quibble with this observation. But the classic
collective action story may be true for some firms. I devote my attention
to these firms.
I assume that there might be a collective action problem because some
firms rationally issue fixed obligations to a large number of investors. A
firm might rationally issue fixed obligations because such obligations can
simultaneously allow managers to hold a significant portion of a firm's
residual claim and subject managers to the consequences of payment
default, including, perhaps, dismissal. The result could be more productive
managers. 6 A firm might rationally issue its fixed obligations to a large
number of investors if no single lender would be willing to provide all
14. See Douglas G. Baird, The Reorganization of Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 913 (1994).
15. Id. at 915, 919. For a full discussion of benefits arising from a financing strategy that
produces a single dominant creditor, see Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,
86 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986).
16. This is a simplification of a complicated issue. Compare, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 312-20 (1976) (noting the residual claimant's incentive to maximize wealth) with
Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 653
(1984) (suggesting that managers who have a substantial investment in their firms may be reluctant to
invest the firm's assets wisely if the investment in question is risky). See also Elizabeth Strock et al.,
Managers, Owners, and the Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 453 (1994).
Suffice it to say here that it may be rational for some firms to invest their managers with a substantial
residual interest and to have those managers face the risk of financial ruin for failure to meet fixed
obligations.
19941
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financing at all times. (This might be the case for some large issuers.) Or
a firm might rationally prefer to have multiple financing sources so as not
to vest in any lender the opportunity to behave strategically with respect to
subsequent loans that only an existing lender, given better information,
could efficiently provide. Thus, the world I imagine is not limited to the
simple firm Baird describes.
The world without debt that I propose is a world with fixed obligations
that a firm might issue to numerous investors. I imagine eliminating only
a single feature of traditional debt: the right of an individual fixed-
obligation claimant to collect. This one feature is significant because it is
the feature of debt that creates the collective action problem and the need
for bankruptcy reorganization law.
My approach is simple. The justification for bankruptcy is the need to
prevent individual creditor collection. I imagine a world in which firms
issue obligations like debt in every respect except the one that creates the
need for bankruptcy. I then ask what might be gained and what might be
lost. Firms that issue fixed obligations to multiple investors might benefit
from a debt-free capital structure by avoiding the expense of restructuring,
through bankruptcy or other means. This expense can be significant, at
least under current bankruptcy law, which divides an insolvent firm's value
through claimant negotiations that often deteriorate into an imbroglio.' 7
Taking as given the desire to protect insolvent but viable firms, it is not
clear that anything significant might be lost by eliminating collection rights.
Elimination of debt, and with it the creditor's right to collect, might cost
little because there is an alternative collective remedy of which fixed-
obligation claimants' could avail themselves. In an earlier paper, I argued
17. For an estimate of bankruptcy reorganization's direct costs, see Lawrence A. Weiss,
Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 285, 289
(1990) (estimating costs to be about 3% of the firms' assets). For what is likely the limiting estimate
of reorganization's indirect costs, from one prominent case, see David M. Cutler & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Taraco-Pennzoil
Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157 (1988) (finding costs running into the billions of dollars). For a
broader estimate of indirect costs, see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Costs oflnefficient Bargaining and
Financial Distress, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 221 (1994). There are, moreover, indirect costs that will not be
reflected in ex post measurements of financial distress costs. That is, there are costs from the tendency
of expensive bankruptcy proceedings to reallocate a firm's value from high- to low- priority claims, thus
reducing the value of high-priority claims to firms that wish to issue such claims. See, e.g., Barry E.
Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 476-79 (1992); Alan Schwartz, The
Absolute Priority Rule and the Finn's Investment Policy, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213 (1994).
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that a firm could, in principle, replace debt with preferred equity.1" This
substitution could create what I call a "Chameleon Equity" firm. Such a
firm would retain the benefits of fixed obligations, but would avoid the
negative consequences of creditor coordination failure-notably postdefault
dismemberment of a viable firm-by eliminating individual creditor
collection. In the simplest Chameleon Equity firm, if insolvency (defined
as asset value less than fixed obligations) led to default, default would
eliminate the preinsolvency common-equity class and would convert the
lowest priority fixed-obligation class to common equity. Any remaining
preferred-equity class would survive unaffected. At any given time,
management would represent the then current common-equity class.19
Thus, in the illustration from Part I, the general creditors would become
the equity class and automatically hold securities worth the firm's entire
going-concern value. A court would not need to provide the collective
remedy because there would be no individual remedy in the first place.
Nothing else would have to change.
In a more complex firm, one with a variety of fixed-obligation priorities,
no court would have to preserve the higher obligations' priority. The
senior obligations would retain their priority because they would survive
complete with fixed claims. This would free the firm to adopt a tiered
hierarchy of priority classes that would keep the firm almost eternally
solvent and almost eternally subject to significant fixed obligations. In the
end, every claimant would get the priority for which it contracted. And,
although there would be questions of default and liability, as there are now
in traditional firms, there would be no postinsolvency restructuring expense.
A Chameleon Equity firm would have to bear the initial transaction costs
of adopting the Chameleon Equity structure. But it is difficult to imagine
that these costs would be, in the long run, anything but trivial additions to
the current costs of contracting for corporate charters and bond cove-
nants.2" Corporate bankruptcy seems unjustified.
I am not so naive as to believe that abolition of bankruptcy or firm
18. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45
STAN. L. REv. 311 (1993).
19. This insight, to the extent it is an insight, is built on a discussion of collective action among
bondholders in Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987).
20. I elaborate on this point in Barry E. Adler, Finance's Theoretical Divide and the Proper Role
oflnsolvency Rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994). In Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted
Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A Reply to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669,
720 (1993), Korobkin describes these costs as "immense," at least because he neglects the possibility
that the contracts could become standard form much like bond covenants under the current regime.
19941
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selection of a Chameleon Equity structure is imminent or even possible.
In my original paper on Chameleon Equity, I described a list of legal and
other impediments to a Chameleon Equity structure. These include tax,
commercial, corporate, and tort law. I also offered a public choice
explanation for the persistence of these impediments.2 Nevertheless, in
principle, a world without debt or bankruptcy, and with contractual
solutions to the collective action problem, seems an efficient world.
III. A RESPONSE TO CRITICS
Unfortunately, the simplicity of the observations discussed above has
been obscured somewhat by the firestorm over a paper by Michael Bradley
and Michael Rosenzweig, titled The Untenable Case for Chapter I].22 In
this paper, written contemporaneously with my original Chameleon Equity
paper, Bradley and Rosenzweig suggest that in a world without bankruptcy
a firm would issue creditors "contingent equity," which would convert to
the residual claim against the firm if the firm defaulted on its debt. In their
proposal, they quite explicitly decline to remove the right of individual
collection against the firm from the creditors who would hold contingent
equity.' Their proposal, therefore, does not offer a solution to the
collective action problem at the heart of the supposed need for bankruptcy
law.24
Consequently, despite the fact that both the Bradley and Rosenzweig
team and I place an adjective before the word "equity," and both propose
a transfer of an insolvent firm to its fixed-obligation claimants (a transfer,
it should be noted, that bankruptcy also accomplishes), our proposals of
market alternatives to bankruptcy could not be more dissimilar. 25  The
proposals differ at their core-on the question of individual creditor
21. See Adler, supra note 18.
22. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE
L.J. 1043 (1992). For evidence of the firestorm, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange
World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 80-81 & nn.5-6 (1992).
23. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 22, at 1085 n.98.
24. I noted this in my original paper on Chameleon Equity, see Adler, supra note 18, at 332-33,
as have others elsewhere. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 22, at 101-03.
25. Neither the Bradley and Rosenzweig team nor I should claim originality for the idea that a
fixed obligation might turn into a residual claim without benefit of a bankruptcy proceeding. See, e.g.,
Robert C. Merton, The Financial System and Economic Performance, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES, 263
(1990); Note, Distress-Contingent Convertible Bonds: A Proposed Solution to the Excess Debt Problem,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1857 (1991). The novelty of Chameleon Equity is its potential for entire change
of corporate debtor-creditor relationships and the consequent freedom to include substantial numbers
of fixed-obligation priority classes.
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collection. Yet at least two skilled scholars, Bob Rasmussen and David
Skeel, have confused my proposal with the Bradley and Rosenzweig
proposal.26 And other skilled scholars, including Lynn LoPucki, Donald
Korobkin, and Elizabeth Warren have attacked market alternatives to
bankruptcy reorganization generally on grounds that may damn "contin-
gent" equity but do not condemn "Chameleon" equity.
The confusion between my proposal and the Bradley and Rosenzweig
proposal apparently has caused critics to miss the key distinction that Baird,
in A World Without Bankruptcy, admonishes us to observe: the distinction
between "bankruptcy issues" and "other issues."'27 In combining "contin-
gent" with "Chameleon" equity, Rasmussen and Skeel have given the
amalgam properties that Bradley and Rosenzweig leave undiscussed and
that I relegate to nonbankruptcy consideration. That is, Rasmussen and
Skeel attribute other characteristics to their own version of the "contingent-
Chameleon" equity structure and then criticize their strawman. They would
not have made this mistake had they focused on the only essential element
of Chameleon Equity: elimination of individual collection rights.
A. Secured Credit Issues
The first illustration of these misunderstandings is Rasmussen's treatment
of secured credit. Rasmussen states that the costs of "contingent-Chame-
leon" equity include:
the cost of reducing some of the benefit that is associated with secured credit.
Current explanations for secured credit focus on the secured creditor's ability
to monitor the specific assets in which it holds a security interest. Contingent
equity is tantamount to giving the secured creditor a security interest in the
entire firm rather than in the specific assets that it intends to monitor."
Bankruptcy reorganization grants priority in distribution to the extent of
collateral value. With respect to the unsecured portion of an undersecured
loan, bankruptcy awards a creditor assets or new claims ratably as on an
unsecured claim.29
Rasmussen's criticism of the "contingent-Chameleon" equity structure
26. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71
TEx. L. REv. 51, 98 n.201 (1992) (describing the proposals as "essentially the same"); David A. Skeel,
Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 465, 475
(describing, as an amalgam, the "contingent/chameleon equity proposal").
27. Baird, supra note 1, at 174.
28. Rasmussen, supra note 26, at 99.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
1994]
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would be a valid criticism of Chameleon Equity if there were something
inherent in the scheme that required ratable entire-firm, rather than asset-
specific, priority. However, there is not. A Chameleon Equity firm might
place secured claimants in its highest priority investor class. In this case,
priority disputes among individuals in the class of secured creditors would
not arise until the firm had passed through insolvency of all lower priority
classes. The Chameleon Equity contracts could provide that, at this point,
each secured creditor could call for a cash auction of its collateral, with the
respective proceeds to reduce each obligee's claim. If directly by, or
through management elected by, claim-amount vote3" the firm outbid
others for items of collateral, the firm would continue. The continuing firm
would be subject to any new claims issued for financing of the asset
purchases. The previously undersecured claimants would receive equity
shares proportional to their respective undersecurity. If the firm did not
outbid the market for the collateral, the auction would liquidate the firm.3
Thus, Chameleon Equity could accommodate the asset-specific priority with
which Rasmussen is concerned.
It is true that such an auction would generate restructuring costs that
Chameleon Equity is designed to save. But the auction would not occur
unless a firm had dissipated all of its initial equity and lower priority fixed-
obligation capital. Therefore, the auction would likely take place only
when the firm had failed so completely that a bankruptcy proceeding would
do no more than conduct the same auction.32 Put simply, it seems
unlikely that facilitation of asset-specific priority is a bankruptcy-i.e.,
collective action-function. In any case, the Chameleon Equity structure
could solve the collective action problem and save firms the expense of
bankruptcy or any collective process while still preserving asset-specific
priority for firms that became insolvent but retained value in excess of their
30. Fully secured and oversecured claimants would be indifferent between continuation and
liquidation, because they would be cashed out in either case. Undersecured claimants would have the
correct, and likely the same, incentives for continuation or liquidation. To protect against the firm's
overbidding induced by a creditor with an interest in the auctioned property, initial contracts could
prevent such a creditor from voting for a bid, or for a representative that would bid, on the creditor's
collateral. At least if that were deemed insufficient or unworkable, initial contracts could prohibit the
firm from paying the creditor an amount in excess of the next highest bid.
31. This contractual alternative supplements the possible alternatives I discussed in my original
Chameleon Equity paper. See Adler, supra note 18, at 327. The proposal here more precisely aligns
the investors' collective voice with the investors' collective interest.
32. Indeed, a substantial number of firms that file for Chapter I I bankruptcy reorganization
liquidate soon thereafter. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11,
102 YALE L.J. 437, 451 (1993).
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highest priority investors' claims.
It is possible that Rasmussen's concern is not about secured claimants
lacking a priority interest in specific collateral, but in their having a priority
interest in assets that do not serve as collateral. Saul Levmore has
suggested that certain items of collateral serve as focal points for monitor-
ing. Levmore argues that general creditors may benefit from secured
creditor monitoring of these focal points.33 Perhaps Rasmussen believes
that entire-firm priority would sap a secured creditor's incentive to monitor
individual focal points. Skeel clearly raises this concern.34
If the incentive to monitor is diminished, all might lose as a result.
However, Chameleon Equity is sufficiently flexible to address the problem.
If investors in a Chameleon Equity firm chose to limit a secured claimant's
priority to the value of collateral, they could place secured claims in a low-
priority class, but give each claimant the right to demand an auction for its
collateral in the event of default on a secured or, for that matter, any claim.
The result would mimic bankruptcy's valuation of collateral in the event of
the firm's insolvency. Again, there would be costs associated with
auctioning the collateral. However, the remainder of the firm's assets and
claims would survive or be transformed according to contract without need
to determine the firm's going-concern value through a bankruptcy
proceeding or a general auction. In contrast to one of these broader
endeavors, the wholly or partially piecemeal sale of assets, back to the firm
or to third parties, could entail easy valuation and consequent low cost
given the potential fungibility of isolated items or limited groups of assets.
The unique integrated system of assets that comprises a going concern
could be far more difficult to value and sell.3"
Because the offer of asset-specific priority does not implicate a collective
action problem, and because Chameleon Equity necessarily differs from
debt subject to bankruptcy only in its treatment of collection, Chameleon
Equity can accommodate asset-specific priority. There is, therefore, no
bankruptcy issue here.
33. See Saul X. Levmnore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49, 56-57 (1982).
34. See Skeel, supra note 26, at 487-90.
35. Important costs of an auction for a going concern stem from strategic and other difficulties in
determining the concern's true value. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter
11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633 (1993).
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B. Dealing with Illiquidity Crises
There is also no bankruptcy issue raised by objections to "contingent" or
"Chameleon" equity on the ground that it lacks flexibility to deal with a
solvent firm's liquidity crisis. LoPucki, Korobkin, and Skeel make much
of the fact that the equity interest in a solvent "contingent" or "Chameleon"
equity firm might sacrifice its equity cushion for failure to make payments
as they came due.36 One might think that a solvent firm could simply
raise new funds by pledging or selling existing assets. But as LoPucki puts
it in his critique of contingent equity:
In traditional bankruptcy theory, an asset is said to be 'illiquid' when its
value cannot be easily converted to cash. If the owner is forced to sell an
illiquid asset under pressure of time, in a market in which there are too few
buyers, or to buyers who must make major expenditures to evaluate the asset,
the sale price may be considerably less than the actual value of the asset....
In the [zero transaction cost world of contingent equity], the problem of
illiquidity does not exist. Because the markets are assumed to be perfect,
anything that has value can be sold for that value, immediately and
costlessly"
In real life, LoPucki and others argue, illiquidity exists. Bankruptcy
reorganization law, they add, permits a judge to solve the liquidity problem
by valuing the assets without recourse to imperfect markets. But, again,
this function of a bankruptcy court is not a collective action function.
Therefore, Chameleon Equity could provide the benefit without a
bankruptcy proceeding.
Implicit in this response is the assumption that bankruptcy provides no
savings of evaluation costs, even supposing that evaluation requires "major
expenditures." This assumption seems valid because, as Jim Bowers points
out, there is no reason to believe a judge can evaluate assets more
parsimoniously than potential purchasers.38 The benefit of bankruptcy,
then, must be in the time the bankruptcy process gives equity to make its
case.
However, a Chameleon Equity firm could provide time as well. A
Chameleon Equity firm could establish in its charter a delay of any
36. See LoPucki, supra note 22, at 100; Korobkin, supra note 20, at 716-19; Skeel, supra note 26,
at 483-84.
37. LoPucki, supra note 22, at 100.
38. See James W. Bowers, The Fantastic Wisconsylvania Zero-Bureaucratic.Cost School of
Bankruptcy Theory: A Comment, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1773, 1784-86 (1993).
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transformation until the firm were in default for some specified period. If
the firm were solvent, equity would use the delay to raise funds and retire
the arrearages (or to cure a technical default). Only if, at the end of the
period, the firm could not raise the capital (including the amount needed
to remedy any technical default) would equity lose its stake in the firm.39
At that point, it would be correct to characterize the firm as insolvent, not
merely illiquid, because, even without the pressure of time, no one would
have been willing to pay more for the firm than the firm owed. Even
under a bankruptcy regime, there must be a day of reckoning for equity if
debt is to be a real obligation. There is no need for bankruptcy here.
C. Removing Incumbent Management
LoPucki also claims that bankruptcy is useful in ridding firms of bad
managers. In criticizing contingent equity, he says:
In the world of imperfect markets and transaction costs, extricating the
productive resources of a failed business from the managers and owners who
presided over the failure can be difficult. Failed owners and managers
commonly cling to their positions, dispute default on bases both real and
imagined, and hunker down in place until the appeals have been exhausted
and the sheriff comes to eject them on the day of reckoning. Particularly
bitter ones sometimes lay waste to everything they cannot take with them as
they begin to evaporate. [William] Whitford and I have argued elsewhere
that chapter 11 plays a crucial role in removing failed management and
shifting ownership and control of large, publicly held companies to their true
residual owners. It does these things in a manner that is emotionally less
than satisfying but strikingly effective. Tainted managers are nearly certain
to be removed; control of an insolvent company almost invariably changes
hands.4"
That bankruptcy reorganization replaces "tainted" managers is not,
however, a tribute to the bankruptcy process. Bankruptcy does establish a
negotiation procedure by which creditors, with court approval, can change
management. But a creditor or a creditor group, rather than the court, is
almost invariably the agent for change. LoPucki himself provides the
evidence for this, noting "heavy creditor involvement in the sacking of
these managers."'" In a Chameleon Equity firm, the fixed-obligation
39. I made this point, though without emphasis, in my original Chameleon Equity article. See
Adler, supra note 18, at 325. See also Bowers, supra note 38, at 1785 n.49.
40. LoPucki, supra note 22, at 104-05 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 96 nn.55-56.
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claimants would take control of an insolvent firm and could sack the
managers directly. No court could interfere. True, there could be a great
number of such claimants, few of whom would have a large enough interest
to get involved with managerial decisions. But in a Chameleon Equity
firm, the same claimants who now pressure courts to remove management
could make a change by simply outvoting the managers.
There is, of course, the potential for some firms that interested claimants
would be too few to remove entrenched management-a problem of
collective action. A Chameleon Equity firm might solve the problem,
however, by disenfranchising manager shares following insolvency and a
class transformation. The firm's initial contracts could also require that the
firm's managers publicly disclose, in advance of any election, information
they might otherwise strategically conceal. These suggestions, adapted
from ideas in an Aghion, Hart, and Moore paper presented at this Confer-
ence, 42 demonstrate that Chameleon Equity is flexible enough to mimic,
without the costs of reorganization or firm auction, not only the beneficial
features of existing bankruptcy law, but of proposals for reform as well.
D. Comparing the Costs
So far I have addressed, and I hope refuted, claims that bankruptcy is
superior to Chameleon Equity because bankruptcy provides benefits that
Chameleon Equity could not provide. However, critics have also argued
that Chameleon Equity would impose costs that bankruptcy does not.
Certainly, this is true of the initial contracting transaction costs, which
would be borne by all firms up front, not only by those firms that became
insolvent at the time of insolvency. But, as noted, contracting transaction
costs might well become trivial.43
Beyond contracting transaction costs, LoPucki and Warren, for example,
identify other costs of a contingent equity structure, costs that a Chameleon
Equity firm would suffer as well. As LoPucki puts it: "In a world with
transaction costs, debtors might well inadvertently or strategically agree to
contracts whose inconsistencies precluded their simultaneous strict
enforcement. Indeed, sorting out inconsistencies among the rights of
competing creditors is frequently cited as one of the primary purposes of
chapter 1." My main point here is that Chapter 11 need not serve this
42. See Philippe Aghion et al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 849, 872
(1994).
43. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
44. LoPucki, supra note 22, at 102 (citations omitted). See also Warren, supra note 32, at 474-77.
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purpose. As I explained in my original Chameleon Equity paper, firms
should be able to publicly bind themselves not to permit individual creditor
collection.45 Public notice of this commitment would also bind third
parties and Chameleon Equity would prevent dismemberment, whatever the
inconsistencies in the debtor firm's promises to investors. These inconsis-
tencies certainly would arise, just as inconsistent claims among secured
creditors arise under the current regime, and litigants would expend
resources resolving the inconsistencies. But there is no reason to have a
bankruptcy proceeding to resolve inconsistent claims. That is, if there is
no collective action problem, an issue of inconsistent claims is not a
bankruptcy issue.
It would be possible to go on in this way, identifying criticisms
apparently applicable to Chameleon Equity and explaining that Chameleon
Equity is flexible enough to mimic a supposed advantage of bankruptcy's
solution to the collective action problem, and without all the costs of
bankruptcy's collective process or of any other ex post restructuring.
However, I hope the above examples adequately illustrate the general
proposition that Chameleon Equity is flexible enough to mimic any
bankruptcy advantage, and at less expense.
IV. A DIFFERENT VIEW OF BANKRUPTCY
There is, finally, the need to confess that my view of bankruptcy is not
the only view. I have treated each bankruptcy benefit described above as
the product of an implicit ex ante investors' bargain, and have argued that
an explicit ex ante bargain, one that does not include ex post judicial
intervention, better serves investors' collective interest. Contrary to my
view, bankruptcy may be seen as a mechanism to alter initial contracts or
to provide ex post adjustments that investors would not or could not
provide ex ante.
Elizabeth Warren has been a leading voice in expressing that the
Bankruptcy Code is, by design, a law intended to redistribute value so that
corporate constituents other than high-priority claimants share in the value
of an insolvent firm.46 There is indeed substantial evidence that bankrupt-
cy has a redistributive effect.47 Warren argues that a contractual insolven-
cy regime, such as Chameleon Equity, would sacrifice this redistributive
45. Adler, supra note 18, at 336-39.
46. See Warren, supra note 32, at 467-71.
47. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 17.
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tendency.
Warren is right, of course, that a contractual regime would frustrate the
goal of legally imposed redistribution from high- to low-priority claimants.
This is tautological. The question is whether such redistribution serves or
disserves social policy.48 It may be, for example, that society should
redistribute wealth ex post from debt security holders to employees and
trade creditors, who may have a noncontractual investment in the firms they
serve. And bankruptcy reorganization may accomplish this by keeping
alive firms that the creditors as a group would liquidate. But, as Baird
noted in an earlier exchange with Warren, it is not clear why bankruptcy
law should provide this benefit to employees and trade creditors.49 Why,
for example, should there not be rules prohibiting all firms from closing
plants, firing employees, and discontinuing trade relationships? It seems
wasteful to require a bankruptcy reorganization when government could
directly provide special treatment of favored corporate constituents.
Similarly, I argued in my original Chameleon Equity paper that the law
should provide nonconsensual claimants with highest priority, but should
do so without disturbing a Chameleon Equity firm's essential character.50
The idea is that nonconsensual claimants of a contractually established
Chameleon Equity firm would, by law, take the firm's highest priority
class. Each claimant would have the right to vote its claim if the class ever
voted, but would lack individual collection rights.5 Warren also worries
that nonconsensual creditors may suffer at the hands of investors, but she
sees a solution in bankruptcy reorganization's distributive tendencies.52
Her solution to the problem of nonconsensual claimants is too limited and,
given the costs of bankruptcy reorganization, wasteful.
There is another argument (alluded to in Part III above), also divorced
from collective action, that bankruptcy reorganization is beneficial because
of its ex post consequences. The supposed benefit is a product of judicial
expertise. The Chameleon Equity structure would remove an insolvent firm
from the supervision of a court, which may know what is good for a firm
48. In addition to bankruptcy redistribution's ex post effects, with which Warren is concerned, it
has been argued that such redistribution enhances overall efficiency. I summarize and critique such
arguments in Adler, supra note 20.
49. Compare Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 815 (1987) with Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHi. L. Rev.
775 (1987).
50. Adler, supra note 18, at 338-40.
51. See id. at 339-40.
52. See Warren, supra note 32, at 472-74.
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better than the investors that would be in control postinsolvency. Such
removal could be inefficient. As Warren puts it, bankruptcy reorganization
provides an opportunity for collective supervision, supported by the power of
the court, to ensure that assets remain in place, that only ordinary business
transactions occur, and that additional financing agreements and contract
obligations are undertaken only after notice to the creditors and a hearing
before the court. It imposes extensive disclosure obligations on the debtor,
so that creditors can monitor the debtor and make more informed decisions
than they could if the debtor were not in bankruptcy.53
The essence of Warren's argument appears to be that court supervision
improves the operation and enhances the value of a bankrupt firm.
Consistent with this argument, one might imagine that a bankruptcy court
could beneficially revise a Chameleon Equity firm's capital structure that
appeared wise to the investors at the firm's inception, but appeared to be
a burden at a time the firm became unable to satisfy its lowest priority
fixed obligations. Assuming this is so, why have court supervision only of
bankrupt firms? Perhaps we should set the bankruptcy bench loose on
investment decisions and capital structures of the Fortune 500. Once again,
even under the Herculean assumption that investors do or should value
judicial intervention-firms do not, for example, voluntarily subject
themselves to periodic disinterested control even though they may
anticipate strategic conflict among investors-it is hard to see why
government control over internal corporate affairs should be a bankruptcy
issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
In A World Without Bankruptcy, Douglas Baird asks what I believe to
be the appropriate question for analysis of any bankruptcy provision: Does
the provision address a collective action problem? Provisions that do not
likely are not properly part of bankruptcy law. Because a world without
debt likely could efficiently eliminate the collective action problem itself,
it seems no regulatory provision is properly part of bankruptcy law.
53. Id. at 475.
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